Distances between formal theories by Friend, Michèle et al.
DISTANCES BETWEEN FORMAL THEORIES
MICHE`LE FRIEND, MOHAMED KHALED, KOEN LEFEVER AND GERGELY SZE´KELY
Abstract. In the literature, there have been several methods and definitions for working out if
two theories are “equivalent” (essentially the same) or not. In this article, we do something subtler.
We provide means to measure distances (and explore connections) between formal theories. We
define two main notions for such distances. A natural definition is that of axiomatic distance,
but we argue that it might be of limited interest. The more interesting and widely applicable
definition is that of conceptual distance which measures the minimum number of concepts that
separate two theories. For instance, we use conceptual distance to show that relativistic and
classical kinematics are distinguished by one concept only. We also develop further notions of
distance, and we include a number of suggestions for applying and extending our project. We
end with a philosophical discussion of the significance of these approaches.
1. Introduction
It is well known that the theory of strict partial orders and the theory of partial orders are “equiv-
alent”, i.e., they have the same essential content. To capture this vague idea, defining a precise
equivalence between theories in general, several formal definitions have been made, e.g., logical
equivalence, definitional equivalence, categorical equivalence, etc. Which theory is equivalent to
which other theory depends on the point of view from which one decides to explore the equivalence
between the theories in question.
In the last few decades, the concept of the equivalence between theories (henceforth: “theory-
equivalence”) has become important for studying the connections between formal theories. Many in-
teresting results have been derived from investigating such equivalence, cf., e.g., [Andre´ka et al., 2005],
[Barrett and Halvorson, 2016], [Japaridze and Jongh, 1998], [Pinter, 1978] and [Visser, 2006]. We
can also look at the question starting from non-equivalence. Given two non-equivalent theories
(according to any chosen definition of theory-equivalence), some natural questions arise: (1) Can
these theories be modified into equivalent theories (in a non-trivial way)? (2) If this can be done,
can we do it in finitely many steps? In other words, what is the degree of their non-equivalence?
In the present paper, we lay down the first steps of a research programme to answer these questions.
In order to investigate some ways to measure how far two theories are from each other; we introduce
a framework that can give a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the connections between formal
theories. We focus on first order theories, but it is worth mentioning that the same work can be
extended to all formal theories of the same type. We develop several notions for distances between
theories, we discuss these notions and we make comparisons between them.
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The idea is very simple: based on a symmetric relation capturing a notion of minimal change, we
introduce a general way to define a distance on any class of objects (not just theories) equipped
with an equivalence relation. The idea is a generalization of the distance between any two nodes in
the same graph, in graph theory. After, we give particular examples when the given class is a class
of first order theories and the equivalence relation is a fixed notion of theory-equivalence.
The first particular example, is that of logical equivalence. As a measure for the degree of logical
non-equivalence, we introduce the concept of axiomatic distance. The idea is to count the minimum
number of axioms that needed to be added or “removed” to get from one theory to the other1. Since
any finite number of axioms can be concatenated by conjunction resulting in only one axiom, one
may think that the axiomatic distance, if it is finite, between two given theories T and T ′ must be
≤ 2, i.e., we need at most two steps to get T from T ′: one step for axiom addition and another one
for axiom removal. This is why we have the intuition that axiomatic distance is not very interesting,
c.f., Problem 1 and Theorem 3.7 herein.
Then we turn to definitional equivalence. Two theories are definitionally equivalent if they cannot
be distinguished by a concept (a formula defining some notion). As a measure for the degree of
definitional non-equivalence, we define conceptual distance. This distance counts the minimum
number of concepts that separate two theories. We find that this distance is of special interest
in the study of logic. We give examples and we count conceptual distance between some specific
theories, see, e.g., Theorem 4.10. We also explore a connection between conceptual distance and
spectrum of theories which is a central topic in model theory, c.f., Proposition 4.13.
Furthermore, we investigate the possible application of conceptual distance in the logical foundation
of physical theories in first order logic. This is indeed an interesting result in its own right, not
only for logicians but also for physicists. We prove that the conceptual distance between classical
and relativistic kinematics is one. In other words, only one concept distinguishes classical and
relativistic kinematics: the existence of a class of observers who are at absolute rest. Such a result
opens several similar questions about how many concepts (and what are they) differentiate two
physical theories.
In philosophy of physics, this will be important because, on the one hand it is clear that we are not
presently converging towards one unified theory of physics in the sense of converging to one set of
laws from which all the phenomena of physics can be derived. On the other hand, we would like
to know the exact relationship between theories. If we know this, then we can form an impression
of how far we are from such a philosophical dream – the dream of the unity of physics. Or, we can
adjust our hopes and expectations, and rest content with a unity of science at a more general level:
as a network of logical theories with precise relations between them.
With the definitions and metrics on distance developed here, we have maps of the network of logical
theories. When we draw such maps of networks, the topology may suggest very interesting and
fruitful questions. For instance: if there is a distance other than zero or one, then is there already
a known theory in between, or if not, we can ask what are the limitative properties of that theory
and what is its philosophical significance? By engaging in such studies, we see the “edge” of the
limitative results, and by examining this edge we more precisely understand the rapport between
meta-logical limitative results and physical phenomena.
1By “removing an axiom” here we only mean the ‘inverse’ of adding an axiom in the following sense: T is a theory
resulting from “removing” one axiom from T ′ if T ′ can be reached from T by adding one axiom.
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2. Elements of first order logic (FOL)
In this section, we briefly recall the basic definitions and notions of first order logic. A language
L is a set of relation symbols each of which is assigned a positive rank. Generally, a language is
assumed to contain some function symbols and/or constant symbols, but every such symbol can be
viewed as a relation symbol in a natural way. Throughout, unless otherwise is stated, languages,
models, theories, etc, are understood to be first order languages, models, theories, etc.
2.1. The syntax of FOL. Given a language L. To construct the formulas, we also need some
other symbols: fixed countable infinite set of individual variables {v0, v1, . . .}, equality symbol “=”
(we deal with first order logic with identity), brackets “(” and “)”, comma “,”, conjunction “∧”,
negation “¬” and the existential quantifier “∃”. The set of formulas Fm of L is the smallest set
that satisfies:
(a) Fm contains each basic formula of L, where the basic formulas are the following two types
of formulas:
(i) The equalities vi = vj , for any i, j ∈ N.
(ii) R(vi0 , . . . , vim), for any relation symbol R of rank m+ 1.
(b) Fm contains ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ and ∃vi ϕ, for each ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm.
Throughout, we will use metavariables, that means we use variable symbols as x, y, z, x0, x1, . . .,
etc. The convention is that a metavariable is to be uniformly substituted with the same instance
from the individual variables in all its appearances in a given formula.
Definition 2.1. Let L be a language and suppose that Fm is the set of formulas of L. Let X ⊆ Fm.
We define F(X) to be the smallest set that satisfies the following:
(a) X ⊆ F(X), and
(b) F(X) contains ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ and ∃x ϕ, for each ϕ,ψ ∈ F(X).
In particular, one can easily see that Fm = F(Basics), where Basics is the set of all basic formulas
of L. As usual, we use the following abbreviations.
• Disjunction, implication, equivalence and universal quantifier:
ϕ ∨ ψ def= ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ϕ→ ψ def= ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
ϕ↔ ψ def= (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) ∀x ϕ def= ¬(∃x ¬ϕ)
• We write x¯ to mean a finite sequence of variables x¯ = x1, . . . , xm. We also use the polyadic
quantifiers ∃x1 · · ·xm ϕ def= ∃x1 · · · ∃xm ϕ.
• We use grouped conjunction ∧ and grouped disjunction ∨. Formally, let Σ be a finite set
of formulas. If Σ = ∅, then ∨Σ is defined to be ¬(x = x) while ∧Σ is defined to be x = x.
Otherwise, fix an enumeration of Σ, say, ϕ1, . . . , ϕm. Then
2∨
Σ
def
= ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕm and
∧
Σ
def
= ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕm.
2There is an ambiguity in this definition because it depends on an enumeration. Since conjunctions and disjunc-
tions are both commutative in FOL, no real harm can be caused by this ambiguity.
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2.2. The semantics of FOL. A model M for language L is a set M enriched with operations
RM ⊆Mm+1, for each relation symbol R with rank m+ 1. An assignment in M is a function τ
that assigns for each variable an element of the set M . Let ϕ ∈ Fm be any formula. The satisfiability
relation M |= ϕ[τ ] is defined recursively as follows:
M, τ |= R(x0, . . . , xm) iff (τ(x0), . . . , τ(xm)) ∈ RM
M, τ |= x = y iff τ(x) = τ(y)
M, τ |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, τ |= ϕ and M, τ |= ψ
M, τ |= ¬ϕ iff M, τ 6|= ϕ
M, τ |= ∃x ϕ iff there is a ∈M such that M, τ [x 7→ a] |= ϕ,
where τ [x 7→ a] is the assignment which agrees with τ on every variable except that τ [x 7→ a](x) = a.
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in M iff there is an assignment τ in M such that M, τ |= ϕ.
A formula ϕ is said to be true in M, in symbols M |= ϕ, iff M, τ |= ϕ, for every assignment τ in
M. The theory of M is defined as follows:
Th(M)
def
= {ϕ ∈ Fm : M |= ϕ}.
2.3. First order theories.
Definition 2.2. Suppose that L is a language and let Fm be its set of formulas. A theory T of L
is a set of formulas (subset of Fm).
We use the same superscripts and subscripts for theories and their corresponding languages and
formulas. For example, if we write T ′ is a theory, then we understand that T ′ is a theory of language
L′ whose set of formulas is Fm′.
Let T be a theory of language L. A model for T is a model for L in which every ψ ∈ T is true.
We say that T is a consistent iff there is at least one model for T . Let ϕ ∈ Fm. We say that
ϕ is satisfiable in T iff ϕ is satisfiable in some model for T . We say that ϕ is a theorem of T ,
in symbols T |= ϕ, iff ϕ is true in every model for T . We say that ϕ is a contradiction to T iff
T |= ¬ϕ. The set of consequences of theory T is defined as follows:
Cn(T )
def
= {ϕ ∈ Fm : T |= ϕ}.
Definition 2.3. Two theories T1 and T2 are called logically equivalent, in symbols T1 ≡ T2, iff
they have the same consequences, i.e., Cn(T1) = Cn(T2).
2.4. More notions for theory-equivalence. Recall the notions of bounded and free variables in
a given formula. Roughly, a variable x that occurs in a formula ϕ in the scope of a quantifier is
said to be a bounded variable in ϕ. A variable x that occurs in a formula ϕ but not in the scope
of any quantifier is called a free variable in ϕ. The notion of free variables specifies places in a
formula where substitution may take place. We write ϕ(x0, . . . , xm) to mean that the free variables
of ϕ are among x0, . . . , xm.
Definition 2.4. Let L1 and L2 be two languages. A translation of L1 into L2 is a map tr :
Fm1 → Fm2 such that, for each formula ϕ ∈ Fm1, tr(ϕ) is defined by the following induction on the
complexity of ϕ:
• tr(x = y) is x = y.
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• For each relation symbol R ∈ L1 of rank m+1, a formula ϕR(v0, . . . , vm) in Fm2 is assigned.
Then tr(R(vi0 , . . . , vim)) is an appropriate substitution of the formula ϕR.
3
• tr commutes with the Boolean connectives:
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ) and tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ).
• Finally, tr(∃x ϕ) = ∃x tr(ϕ).
Definition 2.5. Suppose that T1 and T2 are theories in languages L1 and L2, respectively, and tr
is a translation of L1 into L2. The translation tr is said to be an interpretation of T1 into T2 iff
it maps theorems of T1 into theorems of T2, i.e., for each formula ϕ ∈ Fm1,
T1 |= ϕ =⇒ T2 |= tr(ϕ).
(a) An interpretation tr of T1 into T2 is called faithful interpretation iff for each formula ϕ ∈ Fm1,
T1 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T2 |= tr(ϕ).
(b) An interpretation tr12 of T1 into T2 is called definitional equivalence iff there is an interpre-
tation tr21 of T2 into T1 such that
• T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)↔ ϕ,
• T2 |= tr12
(
tr21(ψ)
)↔ ψ.
for every ϕ ∈ Fm1 and ψ ∈ Fm2. In this case, tr21 is also a definitional equivalence.
Definition 2.6. Two theories T1 and T2 are said to be definitionally equivalent, in symbols
T1  T2, iff there is a definitional equivalence between them.
There are several ways to define definitional equivalence. We here use a variant of the definition in
[Henkin et al., 1985, Definition 4.3.42]. For a discussion on the different definitions of definitional
equivalence, see [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018b], and we refer to [Visser, 2006] for a category theory
based discussion.
Proposition 2.7. Let T1 and T2 be two theories and suppose that tr12 is a definitional equivalence
between T1 and T2, then tr12 is also a faithful interpretation.
Proof. Let T1 and T2 be two theories, and let tr12 be a definitional equivalence between them. Let
ϕ ∈ Fm1, we should show that T1 |= ϕ iff T2 |= tr12(ϕ). Since tr12 is an interpretation, we have
that T1 |= ϕ implies T2 |= tr12(ϕ). To show the converse, let us assume that T2 |= tr12(ϕ). By
Definition 2.5, there is an interpretation tr21 of T2 into T1 such that T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)↔ ϕ. Since
tr21 is an interpretation and T2 |= tr12(ϕ), we have T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)
. Consequently, T1 |= ϕ since
T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)↔ ϕ; and this is what we need to show. 
Definition 2.8. Let T1 and T2 be two theories. We say that T2 is a conservative extension of
T1, in symbols T1 v T2, iff Fm1 ⊆ Fm2 and, for all ϕ ∈ Fm1,
T2 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T1 |= ϕ.
3Here, we need a deterministic mechanism for generating a substituted version of ϕR with no “collisions of
variables”. The are several ways to do this in the literature. For example, we can use Tarski’s substitution of
variables as follows. Let y0, . . . , ym be chosen such that yi = vl+i, where l is the maximum of 0, . . . ,m, i0, . . . , im.
Then the appropriate substitution of ϕR in this case can be the following formula:
∃v0(v0 = y0 ∧ · · · ∧ ∃vm(vm = ym ∧ ∃y0(y0 = vi0 ∧ · · · ∧ ∃ym(ym = vim ∧ ϕR)))).
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We note that T1 v T2 iff the identity translation id : Fm1 → Fm2 is a faithful interpretation.
We also assume familiarity with the basic notions of set theory. For instance, what is a set, a
class, a function, etc. The only difference is that in the context of this paper, there is no point to
distinguish different kinds of infinities. Therefore, instead of cardinality, here we are going to speak
about the size of set X, defined as follows:
||X|| def=
{
k X is finite and has exactly k-many elements,
∞ if X is an infinite set.
3. Cluster networks & Step distances
Now, we introduce a general way of defining a distance on any given class X. We note that one
of our targets is to define distances on the class of all theories, thus we need to work with classes
which are not necessarily sets.
Definition 3.1. By a cluster (X,E) we mean a class X equipped with an equivalence relation E.4
We are interested in distances according to which some different objects are indistinguishable.
Indeed, it is natural to treat equivalent theories as if they were of distance 0 from each other. As
we mentioned in the introduction, there are several notions of equivalence between theories. Such
equivalence thus can be represented in the above definition by the relation E.
Definition 3.2. A cluster network is a triple (X,E,S), where (X,E) is a cluster and S is a
symmetric relation on X.5
Given a cluster network (X,E,S). A path leading from T ∈ X to T ′ ∈ X in (X,E,S) is a finite
sequence b1, . . . , bm of 0’s and 1’s such that there is a sequence T0, . . . , Tm of members of X with
T0 = T , Tm = T
′ and, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
bi = 0 ⇐⇒ Ti−1 E Ti and bi = 1 ⇐⇒ Ti−1 S Ti.
The length of this path is defined to be
∑m
i=0 bi. Two objects T, T
′ ∈ X are connected in (X,E,S)
iff there is a path leading from one of them to the other in (X,E,S).
Definition 3.3. Let X = (X,E,S) be a cluster network. The step distance on X is the function
dX : X×X→ N ∪ {∞} defined as follows. For each T, T ′ ∈ X:
• If T and T ′ are not connected in (X,E,S), then dX (T, T ′) def=∞.
• If T and T ′ are connected in (X,E,S), then
dX (T, T ′)
def
= min{k : ∃ a path leading from T to T ′ whose length is k}.
4All definitions in this section can be formulated within von Neumann–Bernays–Go¨del set theory (NBG). Of
course, ordered pairs of proper classes cannot be formulated even in NBG, but we do not really need ordered pairs
here. Our definitions can be understood as follows: “for all classes X, E, etc. having certain properties there are
classes d, etc. such that...”. We use the notations (−,−) only to make our statements easier to be read and our
proofs easier to be followed.
5See footnote 4 above.
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The equivalence relation E represents pairs that cannot be distinguished by the step distance, while
the symmetric relation S represents the pairs of objects that are (at most) one step away from
each other. The step distance then counts the minimum number of steps needed to reach an object
starting from another object. We may need to say that infinitely many steps are needed, so we
allow ∞ in the range of the step distance.
Example. Let X be any class, let E be the identity relation and let S = X×X. Then, X = (X,E,S)
is a cluster network and its step distance is the following discrete distance:
dX (T, T ′) =
{
0 if T = T ′,
1 if T 6= T ′.
Theorem 3.4. Let X = (X,E,S) be a cluster network and let dX : X×X→ N ∪ {∞} be the step
distance on X . The following are true for each T1, T2, T3 ∈ X.
(a) dX (T1, T2) ≥ 0 and dX (T1, T2) = 0 ⇐⇒ T1 E T2.
(b) dX (T1, T2) = dX (T2, T1).
(c) dX (T1, T2) ≤ dX (T1, T3) + dX (T3, T2).
Proof. Let X = (X,E,S) and dX be as required. Let T1, T2, T3 ∈ X.
(a) Clearly, dX (T1, T2) ≥ 0 for any two T1, T2 ∈ X, and dX (T1, T2) = 0 if T1 E T1 because then
0 is a path from T1 to T2 in X . If dX (T1, T2) = 0, then there is a path 0, . . . , 0 from T1 to
T2 in X . So there is a sequence T ′0, . . . , T ′m ∈ X such that T1 = T ′0, T2 = T ′m and T ′i−1 E T ′i
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence T1 E T2 since E is transitive.
(b) The symmetry is satisfied because E and S are symmetric relations. Hence if b1, . . . , bm is
a path leading from T1 to T2 in X , then bm, . . . , b1 is a path leading from T2 to T1 in X .
(c) The triangle inequality dX (T1, T2) ≤ dX (T1, T3) + dX (T3, T2) follows from the definition
because, if b1, . . . , bm is a path leading from T1 to T3 in X and c1, . . . , ck is a path leading
from T3 to T2 in X , then b1, . . . , bm, c1, . . . , ck is a path leading from T1 to T2 in X . 
Lemma 3.5. Let X = (X,E,S) and X ′ = (X′,E′,S′) be two cluster networks. If one of the following
holds then dX (T1, T2) ≥ dX ′(T1, T2) for each T1, T2 ∈ X.
(i) X ⊆ X′, E = E′ ∩ (X×X), and S = S′ ∩ (X×X).
(ii) X = X′, E ⊆ E′, and S = S′.
(iii) X = X′, E = E′, and S ⊆ S′.
Proof. It follows from the fact that every path in X is contained in X ′ too. Since, it is just routine,
we omit the details from here. 
Now, we use the above general settings to define distances between theories. Before we start, we
need the following convention: Suppose that we are given two theories T and T ′. We write T ← T ′
iff there is ϕ ∈ Fm such that T ∪ {ϕ} ≡ T ′. We also write T − T ′ iff either T ← T ′ or T ′ ← T .
Conventionally, we call the relation ← axiom adding, while the converse relation → is called
axiom removal. It is easy to see that the following are true for any theories T1, T2 and T3.
T1 ← T2 & T2 ← T3 =⇒ T1 ← T3,(1)
T1 ≡ T2 & T2 ← T3 =⇒ T1 ← T3,(2)
T1 ← T2 & T2 ≡ T3 =⇒ T1 ← T3.(3)
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Definition 3.6. Let X be a class of some theories and consider the cluster network (X,≡,−). We
call the step distance on this cluster network axiomatic distance on X. This step distance will
be denoted by AdX.
Let X be a class of theories. We note the following. If there is a path (of finite length) between
T, T ′ ∈ X in the cluster network (X,≡,−), then both T and T ′ must be formulated in the same
language. In other words, if T, T ′ are formulated on different languages, then AdX(T, T ′) = ∞.
This is because two theories can only be logically equivalent if they are formulated on the same
language.
Example. Let X be a class of theories. Let T, T⊥ ∈ X be two theories formulated in the same
language. Suppose that T is consistent while T⊥ is inconsistent. Then, adding a contradiction to
T ensures that AdX(T, T⊥) = 1.
Example. Let X be a class of theories. Let T, ∅ ∈ X be two theories formulated in the same
language such that ∅ is an empty theory (i.e., empty set of formulas). Suppose that T is finitely
axiomatizable, then we have either
AdX(T, ∅) = 1 or T ≡ ∅.
Thus, in the class of all theories, the axiomatic distance between any two finitely axiomatizable
theories is ≤ 2.
Example. Let X be the set of all consistent theories of binary relations, let TP be the theory
of partial orders, and let TE be the theory of equivalence relations. Then AdX(TP , TE) = 2.
It is easy to see this because AdX(TP , TE) ≥ 2 since none of Tp or TE implies the other, and
AdX(TP , TE) ≤ AdX(TP , ∅) + AdX(∅, TE) = 2 by Example 3 and Theorem 3.4 (c).
This gives us the intuition that the axiomatic distance is of limited interest. In most of the cases,
this distance is either 0, 1, 2 or∞. For example, in the class of all complete and consistent theories,
the axiomatic distance is either 0, 1 or ∞.
Problem 1. Let X be the class of all consistent theories. Is it true that, if the axiomatic distance
between T, T ′ ∈ X is finite, then it must be ≤ 2?
Now, let us try to answer the above problem. We define the properties illustrated in Figure 1. Let X
be a class of theories. We say that X has the theory amalgamation property iff for each T ∈ X,
if there are T1, T2 ∈ X such that T1 → T ← T2, then there is T ′ ∈ X such that T1 ← T ′ → T2.
Analogously, we say that X has the theory co-amalgamation property iff for each T ∈ X, if
there are T1, T2 ∈ X such that T1 ← T → T2, then there is T ′ ∈ X such that T1 → T ′ ← T2.
Theorem 3.7. Let X a class of theories having the theory amalgamation property or the theory
co-amalgamation property. Then for all T, T ′ ∈ X, we have the following
(4) AdX(T, T
′) =

0 if T ≡ T ′,
1 if T ′ or T is finitely axiomatizable over the other,
∞ if T and T ′ are not connected in (X,≡,−),
2 otherwise.
Proof. Let us first assume that X has the theory amalgamation property. Suppose that T, T ′ ∈ X
are connected via a path of length 3 in the cluster network (X,≡,−). By (2) and (3), we can find
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T
T2T1
∃T ′
X
(a) amalgamation property
∃T ′
T2T1
T
X
(b) co-amalgamation property
Figure 1. Theory amalgamation properties
T1, T2 ∈ X such that T−T1−T2−T ′. Note that T, T1, T2, T ′ have the same language L and the same
set of formulas Fm. We first show that T and T ′ are connected by a path of length 2. If at least
two consecutive − in the path T −T1−T2−T ′ are in the same direction, e.g., T ← T1 → T2 → T ′,
then we are done by (1). So, we may assume that we have one the cases of Figure 2:
T
T1
T2
T ′
T3
(a) Case 1
T
T1
T3
T ′
T2
(b) Case 2
Figure 2. 3-paths can be replaced by 2-paths
(a) Suppose that we are in the first case T ← T1 → T2 ← T ′. Then by the theory amalgamation
property, there is T3 ∈ X such that T1 ← T3 → T ′. Hence, by (1), we have T ← T3 → T ′
which means T and T ′ are connected by a path of length 2.
(b) Suppose that we are in the second case T → T1 ← T2 → T ′. Then by the theory amal-
gamation property, there is T3 ∈ X such that T ← T3 → T2. Hence, by (1), we have
T ← T3 → T ′ which means T and T ′ are connected by a path of length 2.
Therefore, any path of length 3 can be replaced by a path of length 2. Now, we can prove the
theorem. The first three cases of (4) are obvious, we need to show that otherwise the axiomatic
distance is 2. We use induction on on the length l of path. If the path is of length l = 3, then we
are done by the above discussion. Suppose that we have already proven that every path not longer
than l ≥ 3 can be replaced by a path of length 2. Let path T − T1 − · · · − Tn − T ′ be a path of
length l + 1. By induction hypothesis, path T − T1 − · · · − Tn can be replaced by a path of length
2. Hence, path T −T1− · · · −Tn−T ′ can be replaced by a path of length 3, which can be replaced
by a path of length 2 by the induction hypothesis.
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T T ′
The proof of the case when X has the theory co-amalgamation property is completely analogous,
but going downwards instead of upwards. 
Even though Theorem 3.7 shows the simplicity of axiomatic distance in plenty of cases, it leaves
open the important case when X is the class of all consistent theories (recall Problem 1).
Proposition 3.8. Let X be the class of all consistent theories formulated over a fixed language
L. Then, the class X does not have the theory amalgamation property. Moreover, if L contains at
least a binary relation symbol, then X does not have the theory co-amalgamation property either.
Proof. Let L be a language and let X be the class of all consistent theories of language L. Let T = ∅,
T1 = {∃x(x = x)} and T2 = {∀x(x 6= x)} be three theories in X. Then clearly, T1 → T ← T2, but
there is no consistent theory T ′ ∈ X for which T1 ← T ′ → T2. Hence X does not have the theory
amalgamation property.
Now assume that L contains at least one binary relation symbol R. Let T1 = {¬Ψ(2n) : n ∈ N} and
let T2 = {¬Ψ(2n+1) : n ∈ N} be two theories in X, where Ψ(n) is a formula in language L saying that
there are exactly n-many objects, see page 14 below for precise formulas capturing this. Let ϕ be a
formula in language L requiring that there are infinitely many objects. Using the relation symbol
R it is easy to write up such a formula by requiring that R is irreflexive, transitive and serial. Then
clearly, T1 ∪ {ϕ} ≡ T2 ∪ {ϕ} ≡ {ϕ}. Hence T = {ϕ} is a theory for which T1 ← T → T2. However,
there is no theory T ′ for which T1 → T ′ ← T2 because (1) Cn(T1) ∩ Cn(T2) ≡ ∅ since every model
M is either a model for T1 or a model for T2, and (2) T1 and T2 are not finitely axiomatizable
because their complements are not closed under ultraproducts, see [?, Corollary 9.5.10, p.454].
Consequently, X does not have the theory co-amalgamation property. 
It is worth mentioning that if we replace every occurrence of the logical equivalence ≡ by the
definitional equivalence  then a similar result can be proven in the same way.
4. Conceptual distance
We have shown that axiomatic distance can be simple in many interesting cases. So instead of logical
equivalence, here we consider definitional equivalence. We define conceptual distance between
theories, and we show that it is more interesting than axiomatic distance, in a sense.
Definition 4.1. Let T and T ′ be theories. We say that T ′ is a one-concept-extension of T and
we write T  T ′ iff L′ = L ∪ {R}, for some relation symbol R, and T v T ′. We also write T ∼ T ′
iff T  T ′ or T ′  T , and in this case we say that T and T ′ are separated by at most one
concept.
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Again, we have not define a separate notion of concept removal, instead we understand concept
removal to be the converse of concept adding. Later, in Section 6, we are going to introduce another
notion for concept removal, and a corresponding distance notion that we call bi-directed conceptual
distance.
Definition 4.2. Let X be a class of theories. The step distance induced by the cluster network
(X,,∼) is called conceptual distance on X and is denoted by CdX. In the case when X is the
class of all theories, we omit the subscript and we write Cd.
Intuitively, by a concept we mean a definition, no matter how many different ways one can write
it equivalently. It is apparent that an inconsistent theory is of an infinite conceptual distance from
any consistent theory, because  and  cannot make a consistent theory inconsistent and also
cannot make an inconsistent theory consistent.
Definition 4.3. Let T be a theory and let k ∈ N∪{∞}. We say that the conceptual size of T is
k and we write Cz(T ) = k iff there is a maximal set X ⊆ Fm such that ||X|| = k and T 6|= ϕ ↔ ψ
for any ϕ,ψ ∈ X.6 We call T conceptually finite iff its conceptual size Cz(T ) is finite.
Let us note that a theory that has a model of at least two different elements cannot be conceptually
finite (because we have infinitely many variables). We call a theory T propositional theory iff
T |= ϕ↔ ∃x ϕ for each ϕ ∈ Fm. It is worthy of note that, if a theory T is conceptually finite, then it
is propositional. However, this is not true if we consider other variants of FOL, e.g., finite-variable
fragments.
Lemma 4.4. Let T, T ′ be two arbitrary theories. If there is a faithful interpretation from T to T ′,
then Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′). Consequently,
T  T ′ =⇒ Cz(T ) = Cz(T ′).
Proof. Let T and T ′ be two arbitrary theories, and suppose that tr is a faithful interpretation of
T into T ′. By definition, there is a maximal set X ⊆ Fm of size Cz(T ) such that T 6|= ϕ ↔ ψ
for any ϕ,ψ ∈ X. Let X ′ ⊆ Fm′ be the following set X ′ = {tr(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ X}. Since tr is a
faithful interpretation, T ′ 6|= tr(ϕ ↔ ψ). Hence T ′ 6|= tr(ϕ) ↔ tr(ψ) since tr is an interpretation.
Consequently, Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′). If T  T ′, then by Proposition 2.7 there are faithful interpretations
between T and T ′ in both directions. Hence Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′) ≤ Cz(T ). Therefore, Cz(T ) = Cz(T ′)
and the desired follows. 
Now, as a preparation of showing that conceptual distance can be arbitrary, we compute the
conceptual size of some theories. To do this, we borrow some ideas from the theory of Boolean
algebras.
Definition 4.5. Suppose that T is a theory. An atomic concept of theory T is a formula α ∈ Fm
with the following conditions:
(a) α is satisfiable in theory T .
(b) For each formula ϕ ∈ Fm, exactly one of these formulas α ∧ ϕ and α ∧¬ϕ is a contradiction to
T .
6It might be more convenient in some cases to define the conceptual size as the cardinality of different concepts
of theory T .
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Let T be a theory, and let α,ϕ ∈ Fm. We note that if α ∧ ¬ϕ is a contradiction to T , then
T |= α→ ϕ. So, in this case, we will say that α is below ϕ in T .
Lemma 4.6. Let T be a consistent and conceptually finite theory. Then there is a complete set
of atomic concepts of theory T . That means, there is a finite set Atoms = {α1, . . . , αm} of atomic
concepts of T (for some m ∈ N) such that:
(a) For every different αi, αj ∈ Atoms, the conjunction αi ∧ αj is a contradiction to theory T .
(b) For each formula ϕ ∈ Fm there is Σ ⊆ Atoms with T |= ϕ↔ ∨Σ.
Proof. Let T be a consistent and conceptually finite theory. We first prove the following.
(*) For every formula ϕ ∈ Fm which is satisfiable in theory T , there is an atomic concept α of
T which is below ϕ in T .
Let ϕ ∈ Fm be a satisfiable formula in T . Suppose towards a contradiction that such atomic concept
(mentioned in (*)) does not exist. Thus, ϕ itself is not an atomic concept and so there is ψ1 ∈ Fm
such that ϕ ∧ ψ1 is satisfiable and T 6|= ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ1 (because ϕ ∧ ¬ψ1 is also satisfiable). Again,
ϕ ∧ ψ1 is not an atomic concept. Hence, we can find ψ2 ∈ Fm such that ϕ ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is satisfiable,
T 6|= ϕ ∧ ψ1 ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 and T 6|= ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. If we continue in this procedure, we will get
infinitely many formulas ψ1, ψ2, . . . ∈ Fm such that each of the formulas
ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ1, ϕ ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2, . . .
is satisfiable and none of them is equivalent to another one in theory T . This makes a contradiction
with the conceptual finiteness of theory T . We have showed that (*) is true. Now, suppose that
Atoms = {α1, α2, . . . , αm} is a maximal set of atomic concepts whose elements are different (mu-
tually non-equivalent) in theory T . We can suppose that Atoms is finite because T is conceptually
finite. We claim that Atoms is the desired complete set of atomic concepts. Let αi, αj ∈ Atoms
be such that αi 6= αj . Suppose that αi ∧ αj is satisfiable. Then, by Definition 4.5, both formulas
αi ∧ ¬αj and ¬αi ∧ αj are contradictions. Therefore,
T |= αi → αj and T |= αj → αi,
which contradicts the choice of the set Atoms. It remains to prove the following.
(**) For each formula ϕ ∈ Fm, there is a subset Σ ⊆ Atoms such that
T |= ϕ↔
∨
Σ.
Let ϕ ∈ Fm, and let Σ ⊆ Atoms be the set of all atomic concepts in Atoms that are below ϕ in
T . The direction T |= ϕ← ∨Σ is clear because each element of Σ is below ϕ. Suppose towards a
contradiction that the other direction is not true. Then, ϕ∧∧{¬α : α ∈ Σ} is satisfiable in T , and
by (*), there is must be an atomic concept β below ϕ ∧∧{¬α : α ∈ Σ} in T . Hence, T 6|= β ↔ α
for each α ∈ Atoms. This contradicts the maximality of Atoms. Thus, T |= ϕ ↔ ∨Σ. Therefore,
(**) holds and the statement of the lemma follows. 
Corollary 4.7. Let T be a consistent and conceptually finite theory. Then, there is a finite number
m ∈ N such that Cz(T ) = 2m.
Proof. Let T be a consistent and conceptually finite theory. Suppose that Atoms is a complete set
of atomic concepts for theory T (given by Lemma 4.6). Let Σ,Σ′ ⊆ Atoms be such that Σ 6= Σ′.
We need to prove that T 6|= ∨Σ↔ ∨Σ′. Without loose of generality, we may assume that there is
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an atomic concept α ∈ Atoms such that α ∈ Σ and α 6∈ Σ′. Thus, by the completeness of the set
Atoms, formula
∨
Σ∧α is satisfiable in T while formula ∨Σ′∧α is a contradiction to T . Therefore,
it follows that T 6|= ∨Σ↔ ∨Σ′ as desired. 
Lemma 4.8. Let T, T ′ be two propositional theories. Then,
T  T ′ =⇒ Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′) ≤ (Cz(T ))2.
Proof. Let T, T ′ be two propositional theories and suppose that T  T ′. We may also assume
that both T and T ′ are consistent. If Cz(T ) is infinite, then we are done. So, suppose that T
is conceptually finite. Let the complete set of atomic concepts given by Lemma 4.6 be Atoms =
{α1, . . . , αm}. Suppose that L′ = L ∪ {R}; such R exists by the fact that T  T ′. Let
A = {α1 ∧ R¯, . . . , αm ∧ R¯, α1 ∧ ¬R¯, . . . , αm ∧ ¬R¯}.
Here, R¯
def
= R(v0, . . . , v0). By a simple induction on the complexity of the formulas in Fm
′, one can
easily prove that
(5) (∀ψ ∈ Fm′) (∃Σ ⊆ A) T ′ |= ψ ↔
∨
Σ.
To proceed with the induction, all what we need are the following two facts: (1) A forms a partition
of a (any) theorem of T ′. In other words,
∨
A is a theorem of T ′ and, for each β1, β2 ∈ A, if β1 6= β2
then β1 ∧ β2 is a contradiction to T ′. (2) Theory T ′ is propositional. We omit the details as it is
just a routine.
Let us note that A has exactly 2m elements (as a set). So, by (5), it follows that T ′ can have at most
22m = (2m)2 = (Cz(T ))2 many different concepts. We note that the equality Cz(T ′) = (Cz(T ))2
would happen iff none of the elements in A is contradicting T , while Cz(T ′) = Cz(T ) would happen
iff R¯ is a theorem of T or a contradiction to T . 
Let L∞ be the language that consists of infinitely many unary relation symbols (describing infinitely
many different concepts, say colors)
(6) c1, c2, . . .
For each n ∈ N, we let Ln ⊆ L∞ be the language consists of the first n-many relation symbols from
the list in (6). For each k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, we let Pk = {x = y} be a theory on language Lk. Note that
all the theories P∞, P0, P1, . . . are in fact propositional theories.
Proposition 4.9. Let k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Then Cd(P0, Pk) = k.
Proof. Since Pi  Pi+1 for all i ∈ N, it immediately follows that Cd(P0, Pk) ≤ k. To show that
Cd(P0, Pk) ≥ k, we should show that in any path going from P0 to Pk (in the cluster network
of all theories) there is at least k many one-concept-extension steps. We first note that all the
theories in such a path must be propositional. Indeed, Pk is propositional, a conservative extension
of a propositional theory is propositional theory, too, and the same is true for the definitional
equivalence (one can also see Proposition 4.11 below for an alternative proof). Moreover, one can
check that
{c1 ∧ c2 ∧ . . . ∧ ck,¬c1 ∧ c2 ∧ . . . ∧ ck, . . . ,¬c1 ∧ ¬c2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ck}
is a complete set of atomic concepts of theory Pk. Hence, Cz(Pk) = 2
2k . By Lemma 4.4 and
Lemma 4.8, it is apparent that at least k one-concept-extension steps are needed to increase the
conceptual size Cz(P0) = 2 to Cz(Pk) = 2
2k . 
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Figure 3. Illustration for the proof of Proposition 4.9
Remark 1. The same ideas used in the above proof can be used to prove the following general
observation: For every n,m ∈ N,
Cd(Pn, Pm) = |n−m| and Cd(Pn, P∞) =∞.
Theorem 4.10. For each k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, there are theories T and T ′ of conceptual distance k, i.e.,
Cd(T, T ′) = k.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 4.9 
Now, we introduce an interesting implementation of conceptual distance in model theory. For every
n ∈ N, consider the following formula saying that there are exactly n many distinct objects
Ψ(n)
def
= ∃x1x2 . . . xn
∧
i6=j
xi 6= xj ∧ ∀y
[∨
i
y = xi
] .
Note that a theory T is propositional iff T |= Ψ(1).
Proposition 4.11. Let T and T ′ be two theories such that T |= Ψ(n). Then
Cd(T, T ′) <∞ =⇒ T ′ |= Ψ(n).
In particular, if theory T is a propositional theory and Cd(T, T ′) <∞, then T ′ is also propositional.
Proof. The statement follows from the following simple observation: if T v T ′ or T  T ′, then
T |= Ψ(n) iff T ′ |= Ψ(n). 
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Definition 4.12. Let α be a cardinality. The spectrum of theory T , in symbols I(T, α), is the
number (up to isomorphism) of its models of cardinality α.
Proposition 4.13. Let α be a cardinality and let T and T ′ be two theories formulated on a
countable language. If Cd(T, T ′) < ∞, then T has a model of cardinality α iff T ′ has a model of
cardinality α, i.e.,
Cd(T, T ′) <∞ =⇒ [I(T, α) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ I(T ′, α) 6= 0].
Proof. Let α, T and T ′ be as required. It is enough to show that if T has (does not have) a model
of cardinality α and T ′  T , T ′ v T or T v T ′, then T ′ also has (does not have) a model of
cardinality α.
Suppose that α is a finite cardinality, then T does not have a model over α iff T |= ¬Ψ(α). If T ′ v T
or T v T ′, then T ′ |= ¬Ψ(α) iff T |= ¬Ψ(α) because Ψ(α) is formulated in the common language. If
T ′  T , then
T ′ |= ¬Ψ(α) ⇐⇒ T |= ¬Ψ(α)
because tr(¬Ψ(α)) = ¬Ψ(α) for any translation tr. Hence, T ′ has a model of cardinality α iff T has
a model of cardinality α.
If α is an infinite cardinality, then by Lo¨venheim–Skolem Theorem, T and T ′ have a model of cardi-
nality α iff they have an infinite model. T has an infinite model iff T |= ∃x1x2 . . . xn
(∧
i 6=j xi 6= xj
)
for all n ∈ N. For the same reasons as above, if T ′  T , T ′ v T or T v T ′, then T ′ |=
∃x1x2 . . . xn
(∧
i6=j xi 6= xj
)
iff T |= ∃x1x2 . . . xn
(∧
i6=j xi 6= xj
)
. Hence theory T has an infinite
model and thus a model of cardinality α iff theory T ′ has such a model. 
Problem 2. Can the conceptual distance Cd be characterized, at least for some particular cases,
in terms of spectrum of theories?
Corollary 4.14. The conceptual distance between the theories of any two finite models of different
cardinalities is infinite. More precisely, if A and B are two finite models of different cardinality,
then Cd
(
Th(A),Th(B)
)
=∞.
For instance, given two cyclic groups 〈k1〉 and 〈k2〉 of orders 5 and 7, respectively, the conceptual
distance between the theories of these groups is ∞. This might seem strange; these theories are
talking about similar structures. But if we look carefully at the statement of the above corollary, we
will find that it talks about theories of structures, not the structures themselves. In other words, the
conceptual distance between the theories of 〈k1〉 and 〈k2〉 cannot be granted as a distance between
these two groups as algebraic structures. This conceptual distance can be rather considered as
a distance between the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of the theories of these groups, which are of
course of different nature than the groups themselves. This is planned to be discussed in details in
a forthcoming algebraic oriented paper.
Corollary 4.15. There are infinitely many theories that are conceptually infinitely far from each
other.
Problem 3. Let X be the class of all complete and consistent theories, and let T1, T2 ∈ X. Is it
always true that
Cd(T1, T2) = CdX(T1, T2)?
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5. Conceptual distance in physics
Each physical theory is established based on some preliminary decisions. These decisions are sug-
gested by the accumulation and the assimilation of new knowledge. The methods used to improve
the physical theories are intuitively conceived and applied in a fruitful way, but many obvious
ambiguities have appeared. To clarify these ambiguities, it was critical to introduce the logical
foundation of physical theories.
Even today the logic based axiomatic foundations of physical theories is intensively investigated
by several research groups. For example, the Andre´ka–Ne´meti school axiomatize and investi-
gate special and general relativity theories within first order logic, see, e.g., [Andre´ka et al., 2002],
[Andre´ka et al., 2004] and [Andre´ka et al., 2012]. For similar approaches related to other physical
theories, see, e.g., [Baltag and Smets, 2005], [Krause and Arenhart, 2017].
Following Andre´ka–Ne´meti school’s traditions, two theories ClassicalKin and SpecRel are formulated
in first order logic to capture the intrinsic structures of classical and relativistic kinematics. For
the precise definitions of these theories, one can see [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.67 and p. 69].
In this section, we will investigate the conceptual distance between these two theories.
In [Lefever, 2017] and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a], it was shown that these two theories can be
turned definitionally equivalent by the following two concept manipulating steps:
(1) adding the concept of an observer “being stationary” to the theory of relativistic kinematics
SpecRel and
(2) removing the concept of observers “not moving slower than light” from the theory of classical
kinematics ClassicalKin.
Then, it was shown that even if observers “not moving slower than light” are removed from
ClassicalKin the resulting theory remains definitionally equivalent to ClassicalKin and hence adding
only the concept of “being stationary” to SpecRel is enough to make the two theories equivalent.
Thus, it follows that the conceptual distance between relativistic and classical kinematics is 1.
Theorem 5.1. Classical and relativistic kinematics are distinguished from each other by only one
concept, namely the existence of some distinguished observers captured by formula (7) below, i.e.,
Cd(ClassicalKin,SpecRel) = 1.
Proof. The key to this result is the surprising theorem stating that the only concept which needs
to be added to SpecRel to make it definitional equivalent to ClassicalKin is a concept distinguish-
ing a set of observers that are “being at absolute rest” as proven in [Lefever, 2017, p.72] and
[Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.110]. Let E be the basic unary relation corresponding to this basic
concept. Axiom AxPrimitiveEther, see [Lefever, 2017, p.46] and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.87],
defines E as:
(7) ∃e[IOb(e) ∧ ∀k(E(k)↔ [IOb(k) ∧ ϕ(e, k)])],
where IOb is a basic unary relation for inertial observers and ϕ(e, k) is a formula in the language
of SpecRel capturing that observers e and k are stationary with respect to each other. Let
SpecRelE = SpecRel ∪ {AxPrimitiveEther}.
First we are going to prove that SpecRel SpecRelE. To do so, it is enough to show that SpecRel v
SpecRelE, i.e., SpecRelE is a conservative extension of SpecRel because the languages of these theories
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differ only in the unary relation symbol E. So it is enough to show that for all formula ρ of the
language of SpecRel,
SpecRel |= ρ ⇐⇒ SpecRelE |= ρ.
Let ρ be an arbitrary formula of the language of SpecRel. Since SpecRel ⊆ SpecRelE, SpecRel |= ρ
implies SpecRelE |= ρ. We prove the converse direction by proving that, if SpecRel 6|= ρ, then
SpecRelE 6|= ρ. Let M be a model of SpecRel. Since SpecRel |= ∃xIOb(x), there exists an a ∈ IObM.
Let us fixed such element a of IObM and let extension M′ of M be defined by adding the following
relation to M:
EM
′
=
{
b ∈ IObM : (a, b) ∈ ϕM
}
,
where ϕM is the binary relation defined by formula ϕ(x, y) in model M. By construction, M′ is
a model of SpecRelE. Therefore, if M |= ¬ρ, then M′ |= ¬ρ. Consequently, SpecRel 6|= ρ implies
SpecRelE 6|= ρ, which is what we wanted to prove. This completes the proof of SpecRel SpecRelE,
and hence
Cd(SpecRel,SpecRelE) ≤ 1.
By Corollary 9 in [Lefever, 2017, p.72] and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.110], SpecRelE is defini-
tionally equivalent to ClassicalKin. Hence,
Cd(SpecRelE,ClassicalKin) = 0.
Therefore,
Cd(SpecRel,ClassicalKin) ≤ 1.
However, Cd(SpecRel,ClassicalKin) cannot be 0 since SpecRel and ClassicalKin are not definitionally
equivalent, see Theorem 5 in [Lefever, 2017] or [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a]. Consequently,
Cd(SpecRel,ClassicalKin) = 1
and this is what we wanted to prove. 
Remark 2. From the ideas used in the proof of Theorem 5.1, the following general statement can
be synthesized. Let T be a consistent theory, and let L′ be the new language we can get after we
add a new n-ary relation symbol P to L. Let
T ′ = T ∪ {∃x¯[δ(x¯) ∧ ∀y¯(P (y¯)↔ [δ(y¯) ∧ γ(x¯, y¯)])]},
for some δ, ϕ ∈ Fm, such that T |= ∃x¯δ(x¯). Then T  T ′, and hence Cd(T, T ′) ≤ 1.
There are several ways how one can capture the structures of relativistic and classical kinematics
in mathematical logic. Let us now introduce another way to capture these theories. Let R be the
set of all real numbers. Let Ph ⊆ R4 × R4 be such that (x¯, y¯) ∈ Ph iff coordinate points x¯ and y¯
can be connected by a light signal, i.e., if (x1 − y1)2 − (x2 − y2)2 − (x3 − y3)2 − (x4 − y4)2 = 0.
Let S ⊆ R4 × R4 be the simultaneity relation, i.e., (x¯, y¯) ∈ S iff x1 = y1. Consider the models
R = 〈R4,Ph〉 and N = 〈R4,S,Ph〉, these models capture the structure of special relativity and
classical kinematics, respectively.
Let Tn = Th(N) and Tr = Th(R). Note that Tr is in fact a conservative extension of Tn and the
conceptual distance between them is 1, i.e., Cd(Tn, Tr) = 1.
Problem 4 (Hajnal Andre´ka). Let X be the class of all extensions of Tr that are definitionally
equivalent to a subtheory of Tn. Is the following true: For all T ∈ X,
Cd(Tr, T ) + Cd(T, Tn) = 1?
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If the answer to the question in the above problem is yes, then no matter which classical (i.e.,
Tn-definable, but not Tr-definable) concept we add to special relativity (Tr) we will get classi-
cal kinematics (Tn). That would be an interesting insight understanding the connection between
classical and relativistic concepts.
The investigation in this section opens so many questions: For any two concrete theories of physics,
what is the conceptual distance between them? By Theorem 5.1, relativistic and classical kinematics
are of conceptual distance one. However, the question “what is the distance between relativistic
and classical dynamics?” remains open. Another natural related open problem is the following.
Problem 5 (Jean Paul Van Bendegem). What is the conceptual distance between classical and
statistical thermodynamics?
Of course, any answer to the above problems depends on the chosen axiomatizable theories capturing
the physical theories in question. For an axiomatic approach of these thermodynamics theories, one
can see, e.g., [Carathe´odory, 1909], [Cooper, 1967] and [Lieb and Yngvason, 2000].
6. Ideas for other distances
Interpreting a theory into another one is a fundamental concept in logic. In the following definition,
we define some distance that uses interpretations as the minimal step between theories.
Definition 6.1. For any two theories T1 and T2, we write T1 I T2 iff one of these theories can be
interpreted into the other one. Let X be an arbitrary class of theories. Note that (X,≡, I) is a
cluster network; we call its step distance (defined in section 3) interpretation distance on X.
Another natural idea one may have for defining a distance between theories is using a step that
collapses two concepts into one, i.e., using the symmetric closure of following relation for the minimal
single steps.
Definition 6.2. Let T, T ′ be two theories. We say that T ′ is the resultant of T after collapsing
two concepts iff T ′ ≡ T ∪ {ϕ↔ ψ}, for some ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm.
Example. The theory of abelian groups is the resultant of the theory of all groups after collapsing
the concepts a · b = c and b · a = c.
One can easily see that collapsing two concepts of a theory T is a special case adding an axiom to
T . The converse is also true; adding an axiom ϕ to T is equivalent to collapsing the concept ϕ with
any theorem of T . So using the symmetric closure of the above relation for generating a distance
will give the axiomatic distance (Definition 3.6).
6.1. Dropping symmetry. In several cases, it might be natural not to assume the symmetry of
distances between theories. For example, any inconsistent theory is understood to be of axiomatic
distance 1 from any consistent theory; we just need to add a contradiction as an axiom. But
starting from an inconsistent theory, we can never reach a consistent theory by adding axioms; so
considering this distance to be ∞ seems more natural.
Now, let us mimic the work of section 3 under the consideration that symmetry is not required. For
instance, a directed cluster network is a triple (X,E,R), where (X,E) is a cluster and R is an
arbitrary relation on X. For directed cluster network X = (X,E,R), the directed step distance
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~dX : X × X → N ∪ {∞} can be defined completely analogously to step distance. With a very
similar argument to the proof of Theorem 3.4, we can see that the following are true: For each
T1, T2, T3 ∈ X,
(a) ~dX (T1, T2) ≥ 0 and ~dX (T1, T2) = 0 ⇐⇒ T1 E T2.
(b) ~dX (T1, T2) ≤ ~dX (T1, T3) + ~dX (T3, T2).
Definition 6.3. Recall the axiom adding relation← introduced on page 7 herein. Let X be a class
of theories, then (X,≡,←) is a directed cluster network. It is directed step distance is called the
directed axiomatic distance on X.
Apparently, Theorem 3.7 is no longer true if we replace the axiomatic distance by the mimicked di-
rected one. So, this is one of the situations where dropping the symmetry might be more interesting.
Not just the axiomatic distance can be directed, but also the conceptual distance, interpretation
distance, and so on.
It might be more appropriate to call these distance “uni-directed distances”, indeed in the directed
cluster network the single steps are determined by only one relation. We can also define bi-directed
distances or multi-directed distances where the single steps can be determined by two or more
relations.
For example, it might be useful to introduce the a “new conceptual distance” that measures the
minimum number of concepts needed to be added to or removed from one theory to reach the
other theory up to definitional equivalence. We already have a notion for concept adding (recall  
in Definition 4.1). A precise definition for concept removal is also required. So, in this case, two
relations will indicate the single steps and such new conceptual distance must be a bi-directed step
distance.
The notion of concept-removal below is inspired by the idea how the concept of faster-than-
light observers were removed from the theory capturing classical kinematics in [Lefever, 2017] and
[Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a].
Definition 6.4. Let T, T− be two theories. We say that T− is a concept-removal of T and we
write TmT− iff there is ϕ ∈ Fm such that T− = Tm∪{¬ϕ} for some maximal consistent subtheorey
of Cn(T ) for which Tm 6|= ϕ.
Let us also note that, in some cases, it is possible to remove finitely many concepts in only one step.
For instance, recall from section 4, the propositional theories Pn’s. We have shown there that we
need exactly two steps of adding concepts to get P4 from P2. However, removing a single concept,
namely (c2(x) 6= c3(x)) ∨ (c3(x) 6= c4(x)), from P4 gives P2.
Definition 6.5. Let X be a class of theories and let R be the union of the relations  and m.
The bi-directed conceptual distance on X is the directed step distance of the directed cluster
network (X,,R). In the case when X is the class of all theories, we denote this distance by ~Cd.
The facts ~Cd(P2, P4) = 2 and ~Cd(P4, P2) = 1 show that the bi-directed distance is not symmetric.
Hence conceptual and bi-directed conceptual distances are different, but it is still interesting to
understand how much different they are. For example, the following problem is worth investigating.
Problem 6. Are there two theories T and T ′ such that
Cd(T, T ′) 6= ~Cd(T, T ′) and Cd(T, T ′) 6= ~Cd(T ′, T )?
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It is not straightforward to find this example, each conceptual distance calculated in the present
paper coincides with one of its corresponding bi-directed conceptual distances. In order to do the
same with axiomatic distance, i.e., to define a bi-directed axiomatic distance, all we need is a precise
definition for theorem removal. We propose the following theorem-removal notion.
Definition 6.6. Let T, T− be two theories. We say that T− is a theorem-removal of T iff there
is ϕ ∈ Fm such that T |= ϕ and T− = Tm, where Tm is maximal consistent subtheorey of Cn(T )
for which Tm 6|= ϕ.
7. Concluding philosophical remarks
One very important topic in the philosophy of science, is how different scientific theories can be
compared to each other, especially in the case of competing theories. The first criterion for theory
comparison is empirical adequacy. One theory is better than another if it accounts for more of the
data or phenomena than another. In the past, this has often been, or has been presented as being,
a fairly straightforward matter to decide by philosophers and historians.
This is oversimplified for two reasons. One is that sometimes in the history of science, one theory
accounts for some of the data or phenomena very well. Another accounts for another area of
data very well. They both agree on, but have different accounts of, the same data and both have
failings. The comparison of two theories in terms of empirical adequacy requires that we count
the data or the phenomena. Deciding what to count, and how to assign weight to it, has some
arbitrariness to it. This is very well illustrated in [Chang, 2012] where he discusses the history of
the competition between the phlogiston theory of water and the compound theory of water. With
Chang, we conclude that deciding that one theory is more empirically adequate than another is
not at all times, and in all circumstances, simple and straightforward, and with the fragmentation
of science into more and more specialized areas of research, it is increasingly rare to find empirical
adequacy to be enough to decide between competing theories.
Worse: with more complicated and “cutting-edge” examples, we find that observation in science
is not simple, but is informed by theory and language; making an observation is an informed and
educated act. At the edges of science, we make observations using highly specialized instruments,
which are constructed based on their own theories. Thus, what looked in the past to be a relatively
simple judgment to make: “this scientific theory is better than this other” turns out to be rather
subtle; since it requires individuation and assigning weights, in a way that is arbitrary with respect
to the theories themselves.
Under an over simplified view of the unity of science, the subtlety threatens any pretense science has
to objectivity, because what counts as a true and verifiable statement takes specialized instruments
that we assume to work according to the theory we have of the instrument. If someone has an
alternative account, then the explanation for the phenomenon changes. As a result, if we want to
recover some semblance of objectivity in science, it is ever more pressing to receive confirmation of
a theory from other directions outside the theory.
In terms of objectivity, one reassuring feature of science is its precision. Logic is the most precise
form of investigation. Under the pressure of our considerations above, when we have several logical
theories that are each to some extent empirically adequate, it is not clear that we should retain one
and dismiss the other. We then have pluralism in science. Pluralism in science is an obvious philo-
sophical position when we consider that several theories are all more-or-less empirically adequate,
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and show merits with respect to other, incomparable, or only artificially comparable, virtues and
vices. The virtues might include: simplicity (determined by language, proofs, metaphysical parsi-
mony or concepts), meeting a particular goal of the scientists, neatness of categorization, breadth of
categorisation, standardization of explanation or meeting operational opportunities and so on. Vices
might include: complexity (determined by language, proofs, metaphysical elaborations that have
little use within a theory or concepts), goal failure, messy or narrow categorization, non-standard
explanations, being too ambitious and not going outside the constraints of the operations available.
With this plethora of incommensurable theories all competing and each adequate in their own way
and for their own purpose, we look elsewhere than between the theories in and of themselves and
the data to make sense of the present state of science. What we then look for are other ways of
comparing theories, while accepting them until such time as we come up against a good reason to
give one up, such as: its being refuted by new evidence or being too remote from too many other
theories to be worth pursuing (now).
For this reason, the relations between theories, independent of their relation to reality, becomes
very important. Until now, this area of study has mostly been qualitative. In the present paper,
we explore a new quantitative approach: the measured distance between theories. To establish this
distance, we need to study the structure of the differences, i.e., the connections, between theories. By
developing several such metrics based on our definitions, and noticing that some are less interesting
than others, we already learn a lot. Counting axioms does not give us much information about the
distance between theories. Counting concepts is much more subtle and informative.
One area of study that has a close relationship with the notion of conceptual distance is that of
complexity. As we know, complexity, also can be measured in several ways: Turing complexity, in
terms of the analytic hierarchy, and so on. If one theory is more complex than another in one of
these measures, then it is natural to investigate the relationship between that and the distances we
look at here. Some of the significance of the present work might be in its relationship to complexity
theory. This is a subject of future investigation.
The idea of having a notion of distance between theories (of the same nature) seems applica-
ble in any science. In computer science, programming languages and other systems can be seen
as axiomatized theories. For more details about this, see, e.g., [Floyd, 1967], [Hoare, 1969] and
[Meyer and Halpern, 1982]. Hence, it seems also natural to search for the best fit notion of equiv-
alence between these theories. Developing this may give us insight to determine what can be one
step difference between such two theories. Having these in hand, a distance can be then defined in
the same way of section 3 herein. The novelty here would be in choosing such equivalence and one
step relation in a way guarantees that the corresponding step distance is applicable.
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